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1. Introduction 
 
It was part of Tim Berners-Lee‟s original vision for the World Wide Web (Berners-Lee, 
2002) that it would shortly evolve into a so-called „Semantic Web‟, which would 
(famously) replace a “web of links” with a “web of meaning”. The enormous work that 
has gone into trying to realize this vision raises (for the astute observer) fascinating 
philosophical questions, most notably: What does it mean to „give‟ Web pages meaning? 
The question is philosophical, but the domain of Information Technology (IT) renders 
investigation of it fascinatingly concrete. It thus supplies an ideal opportunity to apply  
Peirce‟s “pragmatic maxim”, which urges that to better understand abstract concepts 
(such as „meaning‟) it is most helpful to think about their specific applications.     
     Many complex and technical discussions of meaning have taken place in philosophy 
over the past 400 years. However such debates have almost all shared a basic set of 
assumptions about meaning which is most unhelpful from an engineering perspective. 
We call this the “Cartesian Framework for Understanding Meaning”. Terrain on the far 
side of these assumptions is only just being glimpsed (and understood as inviting) with 
the help of Peirce. This paper will outline the Cartesian framework for meaning (section 
2), then the Peircean alternative (section 3), then, after a quick sketch of the semantic web 
project (section 4), trace some of the differing strategies and results which these two 
broad approaches may be perceived to bring about (sections 5 and 6).  
 
2. The Cartesian Framework for Understanding Meaning 
 
Key idea: The meaning of a sign is the intention of its producer. This „intention‟ has 2 
key features, which form the basic assumptions of the Cartesian framework: 
i) It is private.  It has a location somehow „in‟ a person‟s mind. The intention‟s 
physical location is not the key issue, though, it is that only the producer of the sign has 
knowledge of it. For Descartes, it was so inaccessible as to constitute a non-physical 
substance − hence the famous „Cartesian dualism‟. 
 ii) It is incorrigible.  I am the ultimate authority on what the signs I produce 
mean. They mean what I intend them to mean. (This is sometimes referred to as a claim 
of „first-person authority‟ with respect to meaning.) 
     Although Descartes doesn‟t discuss meaning explicitly in his “Meditations”, these 
views are extracted from what he says about ideas, which for him are the basic building 
blocks of thought and meaning. In Meditation II (Descartes, 1996), he claims that we 
only have direct access to the world of our ideas, that things in the world are quite 
separate from the ideas that accurately or falsely represent them. Thus for Descartes the 
mind is methodologically disconnected from the world  so much so that he claimed to 
doubt whether the entire external world even exists  and the ultimate authority on what 
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its ideas mean. Error is possible, but not about what one‟s ideas mean, only about the way 
they are put together to form a representation of reality.  
     Later philosophers in the so-called „early modern period‟, such as Locke and Hume, 
embraced a naturalistic empiricism, and gave up Descartes‟ dualistic understanding of 
mind as a separate substance from matter. However they retained his concept of the idea 
(private and incorrigible) as the basic unit of meaning. Thus Locke states:  
 
[W]ords, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas 
in the mind of him that uses them…(Locke, 1994: 3, II, ii) 
 
     In the 19
th
 century Frege rejected the early modern understanding of meaning in terms 
of ideas. He pointed out that the any word, for instance ‘dog’, can be associated with 
many different, bizarre ideas in the minds of different people (disturbing ideas of being 
attacked, happy memories of working at the local pound, and so on). For the purposes of 
logic, Frege wanted a concept of meaning that could be definable more objectively, that 
could make a distinction between how people actually do understand the meaning of a 
sign and how they should understand it in order to grasp true propositions. 
     He therefore claimed that associated with every term was a “sense” (Sinn), which 
existed over and above its “reference” (Bedeutung). This „Sinn‟, was an abstract object, 
common to everyone who grasps the meaning of a term. He sometimes referred to it as 
the „mode of presentation‟ of the sign‟s reference. Thus Frege gave up the privacy of the 
Cartesian model of meaning. However he seems to have kept the incorrigibility. For how 
can I be wrong about the „mode of presentation‟ which I associate with a given term? 
     Frege dreamed that with his new „concept-script‟ he might enable a newly clear and 
objective understanding of the meaning of all our signs. He hoped it would then be 
possible to build all knowledge into an integrated taxonomic system which was 
deductively complete. (This dream was of course shattered by Russell‟s Paradox.) Frege‟s 
insights helped to shape twentieth century philosophy‟s so-called “linguistic turn”, which 
shifted from seeing meaning as an „idea-world relationship‟ to seeing it as a „word-world 
relationship‟ (Hacking, 1975). Such theories were played out with many variations: for 
instance, Quine tried to do away with the concept of meaning altogether for behaviorist 
reasons, without success, Davidson developed an account of the meaning of propositions 
in terms of their „truth-conditions‟, a theory which was then vastly complicated and 
sophisticated via the technical concept of possible worlds. But the one aspect of the 
Cartesian picture that still went unchallenged was its incorrigibility. For, it was thought, 
surely I know what the signs I use mean?
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3. A Peircean Alternative Framework for Understanding Meaning 
 
Key Idea: The meaning of a sign is the process of interpretation which occurs as the sign 
is used. Peirce denied both the privacy and the incorrigibility of the Cartesian framework. 
In its relationship between the sign (idea or word) and the thing in the world, the 
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 To be strictly accurate, this assumption was finally challenged in the 1970s in the discovery of so-called 
„a posteriori necessities‟ – for example „water‟, it is claimed, „means‟ H20 whether its users know that 
water is H20 or not. However this erudite debate is of limited application to the Semantic Web and will be 
ignored (for further details, however, see Legg, 2005).  
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Cartesian framework possessed an essentially dyadic structure. (Frege nearly escapes this 
dyadicity by postulating a sense as well as a reference for every sign. However given that 
sense for him is an abstract object, logically speaking he has arguably replaced a single 
dyadic relationship with two dyadic relationships.) Peirce‟s triadic model of the sign, by 
contrast, consists in an irreducible relation between three elements: 
 
 
Fig. 1: Peirce: Structure of a sign. 
 
The representamen is the actual signifying item. The object is what the sign refers to in 
the world. The interpretant, however, is Peirce‟s original addition to understanding 
meaning. It consists in further uses of the same sign to represent the same object. This is 
just to say that a sign must represent an object in such a way that it is understood and 
used again. For example, imagine that I decide to name a new star. This will not work 
unless other people learn the name and use it to pick out the same star. If I just stare at the 
night-sky, pick a name, and tell no-one about it, the process is literally meaningless, for 
Peirce, whatever my intentions. 
    Note that the interpretants, although they pick out the same object as the original sign, 
can „interpret‟ that object in ways that differ to some degree from the ways it was 
interpreted originally. That is, they can not just continue but also add to, or even shift the 
meaning of the sign. One classic example is the word „atom‟ as used by Democritus, and 
by us. Etymologically, in ancient Greek „a-tom‟ meant something that cannot be broken 
up, but of course we have now „split the atom‟. Yet in some sense we are arguably still 
talking about the same things Democritus was, and the transition from the ancient to the 
present meaning was not clean or discrete. Thus by contrast to the Cartesian framework, 
we now have corrigibility with respect to meaning. The intention of the sign‟s producer is 
no longer the ultimate authority  when Democritus talked of „atoms‟, he meant more 
than he knew.  
     One might ask at this point: So what is the real meaning of the sign? The original or 
the ultimate interpretation? However, do we have to choose? Peirce‟s theory raises the 
possibility that we do not. Arguably now it is more helpful to understand meaning not as 
an object (whose „properties‟ can be argued over and had better not be contradictory), but 
as a process. In some real sense the meaning of a sign is what that sign does – how it 
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spreads and grows (if, indeed, it does spread and grow). Thus, Peirce wrote (in a striking 
anticipation of contemporary use of the word „virtual‟): 
 
no present actual thought (which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual 
value; for this lies not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be 
connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a 
thought is altogether something virtual (Peirce, 1868). 
 
     Note how this account renders meaning public. In the Cartesian framework, to really 
know what a sign means, you would need to get into the head of its producer (which alas 
is not possible). In the Peircean framework, to know what a sign means, look at what 
people are doing with it. Thus the responsibility for the meaning of a sign resides in a 
whole community. Relatedly, Peirce derived his account of truth by idealizing over this 
process of developing and using signs in a „community of inquiry‟, a view which has 
been widely criticized as insufficiently objective. Yet Peirce denied this, claiming that 
over the long-run, within a broad enough community, sign-use was intrinsically self-
correcting. It is also important to note that what the community is „doing with‟ a given 
sign is not just what they are „doing with it in their heads‟ by thinking about it, but what 
kinds of practical activities they are scaffolding with its help. Consider for instance, the 
term „potting mix‟. For Peirce it is part of its very meaning that people actually buy a 
certain brown stuff, put it in pots and insert plants in it. 
      As co-founder of the new predicate logic, Peirce pursued a vision interestingly 
different to Frege‟s regarding how it should advance human knowledge. As a pragmatist 
Peirce thought Frege‟s attempt to explicitly formalize the entire meaning of signs 
impossible, for an irreducible dimension of the meaning of any sign, such as „tree‟, is the 
effects which an agent situated in the world would experience in relevant situations, such 
as tree-climbing, botanical investigations of new tree species, and so on, and not all of 
these can be anticipated in advance. In short, then, Peirce replaces a static model of 
meaning-as-object with a new dynamic model of meaning-as-process, where what a sign 
means is open to view (public), able to shift and change over time (corrigible), and 
inextricably entwined with actual tasks and projects. 
 
4. The Semantic Web: An Overview 
 
4.1 Goals and Challenges 
 
Semantic Web developers embrace a wide variety of goals, including (from lesser to 
greater ambitiousness): 
 disambiguating „merely syntactic‟ Web searches, for instance distinguishing 
“Turkey” the country from “Turkey” the bird.  
 finding „semantic joins‟ in databases 
 indexing text and semantic markup together in order to improve Web retrieval 
performance (to turn the entire Web into one enormous „distributed 
database‟). 
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 enabling software agents to interpret the meaning of websites in order to solve 
a wide range of arbitrarily complex tasks (from document-search to 
scheduling doctor‟s appointments) 
 
     Challenges for implementing it may be divided into „technical‟ and „human‟. 
Technical challenges include inferential tractability, logical consistency, and the rapid 
changeability of information on the Web. The human challenges are equally problematic, 
and include: “Who will mark up Web pages with the required semantic metadata?”, and 
“Who gets to say what that metadata means”?   
 
4.2 Basic Technologies 
 
Semantic web development so far has centered around two new markup languages, which 
however by themselves are not sufficient to create a „Web semantics‟. 
     1) XML. XML was initially conceived of as a simple way to send documents across 
the Web, allowing authors to define their own tags, and thus document formats, subject to 
a simple syntax. Each new tag is linked to some unique „namespace‟. Though the term 
„namespace‟ might suggest some further document which includes definitions for the 
tags, in practice it is often just a naked URI, essentially only a way of indexing different 
tags uniquely via prefixes.  
     Anyone can define an XML namespace. So how do they relate to each other, 
semantically-speaking? Do two tags from different namespaces have the same meaning if 
they consist of the same character-string? No, for I could define a <pine> tag in my 
namespace to „mean‟ pine trees, while a <pine> tag in another namespace is designed to 
apply to pine wood and anything made from it. Thus each namespace‟s tags are assumed 
to be distinct in meaning, and translating between them is a further problem. Thus XML 
arguably only provides „syntactic‟ interoperability at best. This should not be too 
surprising since XML was not designed to share meaning so much as „document format‟, 
a concept which includes any kind of structure within data (e.g. that a document contains 
just four elements). Semantic web developers‟ desire to represent meaning more purely 
and explicitly led to the development of RDF. 
 
     2) RDF. RDF stands for „Resource Description Framework‟. Strictly speaking, RDF is 
not a language but a data-model. In a key advance on XML, RDF introduces 
propositional structure. Each RDF „proposition‟ has three parts, sometimes referred to as 
„subject‟, „predicate‟ and „object‟ (e.g. Beckett 2004, Swartz, 2002), and sometimes as 
„object‟, „attribute‟, and „value‟ (e.g. Decker et al, 2000). As an example, take the 
proposition:         The Kauri is a kind of pine tree. 
Here the subject/object would be „Kauri‟, the „predicate/attribute/ would be „a kind of‟, 
and the object/value would be „pine tree‟. 
     Does marking up web pages with RDF propositions make the Web „semantic‟? In the 
example above, a propositional structure exists, with all three components envisaged to 
be assigned URIs. However we have seen that URIs are merely indices. Once again, RDF 
does not determine what they are indexed to. As Sowa has written: 
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By standardizing the notations, XML and RDF take an important first step, but that 
step is insufficient for data sharing without some way of comparing, relating, and 
translating the vocabularies. (Sowa, 2000). 
 
5. Cartesian Approaches to Web Semantics 
 
Key idea: Try to define an authoritative sign-producer‟s intention for what each sign 
should mean. If one believes that the meaning of a sign resides in what the user of a sign 
intends it to mean, it would appear that the way to give the Web meaning is to try to 
define that intention, in machine-readable fashion, as fully and determinately as possible. 
This thinking has resulted in many attempts to set up silos of meaning, also known as 
„formal ontologies‟. Some key examples will now be discussed.  
     1) RDFS. RDF Schema, an extension of RDF, allowed one to declare classes, and 
properties, populate classes with instances, and organize them into a subsumption 
hierarchy. It also allowed range and domain constraints to be added to properties, and 
properties to be ascribed to individuals. It was initially envisaged that web-semantics-
defining ontologies would be stored in this language. However, RDFS turned out to be 
too logically simple to express a great deal of what one might wish to say to 
authoritatively define the meanings of terms. Though one can declare new classes and 
populate them with instances, one cannot say anything further about these classes and 
instances (Delteil et al, 2001). For instance, one cannot state that two names denote the 
same person. At the end of the day RDFS is still just a set of terms indexed via 
namespaces whose further meaning is opaque. RDFS was never widely used and its main 
components are now folded into the more expressive OWL (see next).  
     2) OWL. OWL („Web Ontology Language‟) was a renaming and reworking of 
DAML+OIL. It became a W3C Recommendation in February 2004 and is currently the 
flagship ontology of the W3C group. OWL goes beyond RDFS by providing additional 
vocabulary and a formal semantics. The additional vocabulary includes the ability to 
define classes in terms of logical relationships between other classes, the ability to state 
class cardinality, equality (for both classes and individuals), and logical characteristics of 
properties. It was hoped that this greater expressivity would enable it to outdo RDFS in 
capturing all information needed to define the semantics of terms on the web. Greater 
expressivity has costs in inferential tractability, however, so OWL has three versions, 
each an extension of the previous: OWL Lite, OWL DL and OWL Full. 
     The W3C envisaged that once they provided the OWL language, the world would 
respond by defining and contributing ontologies, and a number of ontology libraries / 
clearing-houses have been set up for this purpose (for instance: the DAML ontology 
library http://www.daml.org/ontologies/, and the Protégé ontology library 
http://protege.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?ProtegeOntologiesLibrary). However at present 
coverage is patchy at best. For instance regarding our test-concept, „tree‟, a search on 
Swoogle, UMBC‟s ontology search engine (http://swoogle.umbc.edu), produces just a 
few very scattered assertions.
2
 It would thus appear that OWL is not currently widely 
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 for example, “A Tree is a kind of LandscapeProduct” in 
http://individual.utoronto.ca/hesham/Ontology/IPDLite.owl, and nothing else, “A TreeRing is a kind of 
Vegetation” in http://sweet.jpl.nasa.gov/ontology/biosphere.owl, and nothing else. These assertions are 
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used outside the academic research context (though OWL DL is used more than the other 
two).  
     There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, it is clumsy and verbose: the OWL 
translation of, “A student is a person who is enrolled in at least one thing” runs to 10 
complex nested lines. Secondly, it is complained that its graph/tree data-structure does 
not scale for real-world applications  foundering for example, when dealing with the 
information in a typical business spreadsheet (Bergman, 2006), nor does it allow user-
defined datatypes. Finally, the exact formal relationship between OWL and RDF is a 
delicate matter. While OWL Full can be viewed as an extension of RDF, OWL Lite and 
OWL DL can only be viewed as extensions of a restricted view of RDF. (McGuinness 
and van Harmelen, 2004). This creates a problem for layering OWL over RDF. From the 
Peircean perspective, however, OWL‟s most fundamental issue is the „human‟ one: its 
current lack of use. 
     3) CYC. The original (yet continuing) most ambitious formal ontology project of all is 
the Cyc project (http://www.cyc.com). It has deep roots in classical AI. It is most 
ambitious in terms of size (over 600 000 categories), depth of knowledge (over 2 million 
axioms), and time devoted to it (over 700 person-years) (Sowa, 2004). It has its own 
purpose-built inference engine, and natural language interface. The Cyc project is the 
most systematic, unified attempt to not just index terms but to describe their meanings in 
machine-readable terms. Thus its representation of a tree, #$Tree-ThePlant, is 
distinguished from #$Tree-PathSystem. It comes with axiomatic assertions (for 
instance, “A tree is largely made of wood”) and rules (for instance, “If a tree is cut down, 
then it will be destroyed”), from which further facts can be deduced (for instance, “If the 
pine tree in my backyard is cut down, then it will be destroyed.”). It manages to bypass 
the W3C‟s problems with layering OWL on RDF, by using its own in-house language, 
the purpose-built CycL (which has the expressivity of higher-order logic). 
     The company has made strenuous efforts to position itself for the Semantic Web, by 
for instance mapping in databases such as FIPS (Federal Information Processing 
Standards), the CIA WorldFactbook, (Reed & Lenat, 2002), and WordNet, and producing 
automated OWL annotation of text documents (Witbrock et al, 2004). Nevertheless, once 
again, unfortunately Semantic Web developers outside the company have so far made 
little use of this ontology. Its system of categories is extremely complex, requiring 
philosophical training to understand. Inferential tractability is a particular worry given the 
expressivity of the CycL language, and the monolithic holism of such a giant ontology 
unfortunately leads to brittleness. 
     In conclusion, then, the attempts of these formal ontology projects to „create ex nihilo‟ 
the meaning of signs on the semantic web via a set of antecedent definitions 
misunderstand what it is for something to have meaning. From a Peircean perspective the 
mere fact that these projects are not widely used is the key argument against their having 
real „significance‟.   
                                                                                                                                                 
mixed with many others concerning trees as mathematical structures, with no obvious way of telling that 
this is a different concept.  
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6. Peircean Approaches to Web Semantics 
 
Key idea: Build applications which allow interpretants to freely grow, within whatever 
communities choose to use them. What is growing right now on the Web? Some 
developments manifestly are. (These are sometimes referred to as the „lower-case 
semantic web‟, by contrast to the W3C‟s official efforts): 
     1) Tagging. Tags are labels added to the Web voluntarily by users. Ontologically 
speaking, the practice is entirely uncontrolled – no categories are prepared or agreed upon 
in advance. (Thus a given CD might be labelled “boring”, “Mike_likes_this”, 
“driving_music”, and “songs_about_fish”). Tagging began as a way of labelling web-
pages with words or phrases meaningful to oneself in order to rediscover them quickly, 
but has spread to embrace a number of other much more public uses, as a variety of 
websites has emerged to serve as tag clearing-houses. Examples of such sites include 
del.icio.us. for tagged bookmarks (http://del.icio.us/) and Flickr for tagged photographs 
(http://www.flickr.com/).  
    Tagging is said to produce not a taxonomy (in the sense of a mark-up according to a 
pre-given ontology) but a „folksonomy‟ (Weinberger, 2005).  Despite the „feral‟ source of 
tags, it has been argued that at the level of the entire Web the impact of individual 
idiosyncrasy lessens, and that, “[b]y forgoing formal classification, tags enable a huge 
amount of user-produced organizational value, at vanishingly small cost” (Shirky, 2005). 
     2) RSS autodiscovery. This technology „syndicates‟ websites (frequently weblogs) by 
providing summaries of their content, links to the full version, and other meta-data, in an 
XML file called an RSS feed. Content is filtered for individual users using keywords (the 
choice of which once again is wholly personal and idiosyncratic).  
     3) Collaborative websites. These provide a medium in which speakers of any language 
define, describe and discuss topics of contemporary relevance. The resulting information 
is freely available, electronically encoded and conveniently presented. Such websites are 
quickly springing up on every conceivable subject, for instance: music 
(http://musicbrainz.org/), exercise (http://www.favoriterun.com/) and biosecurity 
(http://paipm.cas.psu.edu/ biosecurity.html), to give just a few examples. One of the 
original and most impressive websites, however, and by far the most comprehensive, is 
the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia. This project is a remarkable and unanticipated 
realisation of Peirce‟s „community of inquiry‟, its ever-increasing level of accuracy 
causing considerable surprise in those who do not hold to Peirce‟s theory of truth (but a 
sense of vindication in those who do). 
 
6.1 A Case-Study in Semantics Extraction from User-Supplied Web Content. 
 
Wikipedia‟s immense potential as an automated, just-in-time source of semantic 
knowledge, by contrast to manually encoded, „frozen‟ silos of meaning, is just beginning 
to be explored scientifically. Each web page / article in Wikipedia defines a specific 
concept and is inter-linked with other articles in the encyclopaedia. Milne et al. (2006) 
extract a thesaurus by treating article names as terms and hyperlinks as semantic relations 
between them. By looking at different types of links, they are able to identify three types 
of semantic relations that are commonly used in manually crafted thesauri: 
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 Synonymy/Polysemy – Redirect pages in Wikipedia link synonymous phrases to 
the same article (e.g. „Pine tree‟ is linked to „Pine‟). Disambiguation pages help to 
identify ambiguous terms (e.g. „Tree‟ as „woody plant‟ and „Tree‟ as  „data 
structure‟, along with 14 other possible senses) 
 Hierarchical relations – Wikipedia‟s category structure defines relations between 
broader and narrower concepts (e.g. „Pine‟ belongs to the category „Pinaceae‟, 
which is in turn a part of the category „Plant families‟). 
 Associative relations – Any other hyperlinks connecting article pages are 
association between the concepts of different strength. (e.g. On the page „Pine‟ 
there are links to articles „pine nuts‟, „evergreen‟,  „christmas trees‟ and „parks‟). 
In this way they concretely demonstrate how a semantic knowledge base can be created 
on-the-fly, tailored to any document collection. Figure 2 demonstrates an example, where 
a mini-version of a thesaurus was extracted given merely Wikipedia and the following 
short document: 
“Tane Mahuta is New Zealand's tallest Kauri Tree, growing in Waipoua Forest. 
Its massive smooth, grey-white trunk rises 59 feet before a branch appears.” 
Thick lines represent hierarchical relations, thin lines are association relations; dotted 
lines reflect polysemy relations to homonyms. Note the detail of this result by contrast to 
the random and patchy coverage of current OWL ontologies. Furthermore, this semantic 
structure reflects public opinion on the relatedness between document terms, it reflects an 
up-to-the-minute version of it, and the restriction to a particular document guarantees that 
all included terms are relevant for this particular knowledge domain. 
 Given a large agricultural document collection and a thesaurus Agrovoc, 
manually created to cover the same domain, Milne et al. report that Wikipedia covers 
more than twice as many document concepts as Agrovoc.  
 
Figure 2. Thesaurus extracted from Wikipedia for a sample document.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Cartesians assume that in order to make the Semantic Web happen it is necessary to make 
a huge defining effort, to somehow encode for the computer the private intentions we 
have when we produce signs. The Peircean approach by contrast involves realizing that 
vast quantities of semantic data already exists on the Web, our job is to work out how to 
 10 
leverage it. It might be objected that it is difficult to envisage how any kind of coherent 
inferencing might be built on such a turbulent and amateur base as (is most of) this user-
supplied metadata. Still, these criticisms might be made of Google‟s deployment of its 
spectacularly successful page-rank algorithm across the turbulent and amateur World 
Wide Web. Google‟s genius was to realize that it did not need to pay people to inspect 
and rate websites, as such data already existed in the form of hyperlinks. In Peircean 
terms, we can say that Google realized that hyperlinks constitute interpretants of the 
web-pages they link to. For in most cases such links indicate that the creator of the 
linking page thought that their page was in some sense relevant to, and thus about the 
same thing (object) as the linked-to page. In a similar way, then, tags can be considered 
as interpretants of the webpages they describe, blog syndications as interpretants of the 
blogs syndicated, Wikipedia entries as interpretants of the terms defined, and so on. The 
kinds of inferencing that will trace such interpretants and transform them into semantic 
data is not the neat, deductivist rule-based reasoning of „good old fashioned AI‟. We need 
new models.  
     Having mentioned AI, it‟s worth noting that here also philosophical theories of 
meaning are not mere abstract speculation but directly influence what we envision and 
attempt to build. This is not surprising since the Semantic Web at its most boosterish 
arguably consists in many old AI goals in 1990s dress (Halpin, 2004). The classic 1950s-
era model of AI – something like a digital encyclopedia in the head of a robot – may now 
be seen as a poignant attempt to make concrete the Cartesian picture of meaning as idea 
in the head. By contrast, Peirce‟s account of meaning as interpretants led him to write, 
“just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we ought to say 
that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us.” (Peirce, 1868). In this sense, 
perhaps as with „Web semantics‟ also with „Web intelligence‟ we already have more at 
our disposal than we realize.    
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